Highway Costs and the Efficient Mix of State and Local Funds by David Levinson & Bhanu Yerra
Governments and transportation networks are both hierarchically
organized. Some state governments ﬁnance most of their highways,
whereas in other states similar roads are financed locally. Larger gov-
ernments attain scale economies. However, they also tend to be more
bureaucratic and have higher operating costs, all else being equal,
because of problems such as span of control. A study was done to relate
highway expenditures with the share of expenditure by state govern-
ments to determine how governments should allocate expenditure on all
roads in a state. Highways are divided into two hierarchical classes
(higher and lower), governments into two layers (state and local), and
costs into capital and operations and maintenance. Regression models
to predict different highway expenditures on each highway class as a
function of utilization, capacity, and funding shares are estimated. It 
is found that there is a share of expenditures by each level of government
for each highway class that results in a minimum expenditure for each
funding category (capital and operations). That minimum is not very
far from typical state and local mixes found in many states. The results
can be applied in formulation of efficient network ﬁnancing arrange-
ments. Policies can be formulated that would help adjust the ﬁnancial
responsibilities of transportation networks between government layers.
States are continually considering returning some roads to localities
while assuming responsibility for other local roads, so determining
what level of government should be responsible for provision,
ﬁnance, operation, and regulation of each highway class is an impor-
tant issue. Management of a highway class by a geographically too
small or too large jurisdiction brings about extra costs that can be
avoided by appropriately assigning government layers to a roadway
class. The objective of this study is to ﬁnd the share of costs borne
by each government layer for each highway class that minimizes
expenditures.
Both highways and government are hierarchically arranged.
Highways are classiﬁed into hierarchies depending on the amount
of through movement and land access they provide (1). The shape
and slope of the hierarchical pyramid of highways depend on the
length or number of highways in a state that falls into each class.
Government is classiﬁed into hierarchical layers depending on the
area administered under its jurisdiction.
Each class of highway is controlled or ﬁnanced by a set of gov-
ernment layers. A new dimension can be added to this problem if
different costs, shared by a set of government layers, are considered.
With this cost dimension, the hierarchical pyramid of highways is
represented in Figure 1. Each block in Figure 1 represents dollars
invested (or expenditure share) by a government layer in a highway
class for a particular purpose such as maintenance or capital outlay.
If a government layer is not funding certain cost categories of a
highway class, that block in Figure 1 is zero.
Government layers associated with a highway class can share
costs in different proportions to reach a minimum. Figure 2 shows
the variation of cost with respect to share of expenditure follow-
ing a parabolic form. If significant economies of scale exist, the
optimal expenditure is near to 100% state-funded, but if there are
large diseconomies, for instance, management costs and span of
control issues, the optimal share moves to the left in Figure 2. Only
two types of government levels are considered in this study: state
and local. Federal dollars are channeled through states and so are
combined with state dollars here. The share of expenditure by a
government layer is considered a variable in the model, allowing
the attainment of an optimal combination that minimizes highway
expenditures.
Capital outlay and maintenance costs are also differentiated.
Capital outlays are associated with highway improvements, includ-
ing land acquisition and other right-of-way costs; preliminary and
construction engineering; construction and reconstruction; resur-
facing, rehabilitation, and restoration costs of roadway and struc-
ture; and installation of traffic service facilities such as guardrails,
fencing, signs, and signals (2). Maintenance costs, or investments
in existing highways, are required to keep highways in usable con-
dition. Total cost is defined as the sum of capital outlay and main-
tenance costs, thereby excluding administration and miscellaneous,
highway law enforcement and safety, interest, and bond retirement
costs.
The FHWA Highway Statistics series deﬁnes 12 roadway classes,
which are grouped here into higher and lower classes. The higher
class consists of Interstates, principal arterials, and minor arterials.
The lower class consists of major collectors, minor collectors, and
local roads. An all-roads case is also considered in modeling.
Expenditure on a highway depends on that road’s output, net-
work extent, and prices of inputs. Since determining optimal
expenditure shares by associated government layers is the objec-
tive of this study, expenditure share is an important variable in the
model and is introduced in quadratic form. Different output vari-
ables on which highway expenditure depends are vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) by passenger cars, trucks, and other vehicles. A few
network variables are length of highways, average width of high-
ways, average number of lanes, average thickness of the pavement,
and so on.
Previous studies (3) that included prices of capital, labor, and
construction materials as independent variables found that although
prices of construction materials were not significant, interest rates
and labor costs were significant factors in the long run but insignif-
icant in the short run. However, it has not been possible to suc-
cessfully estimate a model with prices, output, and network extent
simultaneously.
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The data required for the analysis were obtained from the U.S.
Department of Transportation for 1996 (2).
This model requires capital outlay and maintenance costs for higher
and lower road classes by state and local governments. The ﬂow of
money between state and local governments by cost and highway
class is shown in Figure 3. Local government is assumed to be invest-
ing directly on lower-class roads only. But payments from local to
state government are in turn invested on both higher- and lower-class
roads. Therefore, local government is indirectly investing in higher-
class roads. Similarly state government aid to local government,
which is actually listed as local government expenditure, is counted
as investment by state government and is distributed to lower-class
roads. Units for the costs are thousands of dollars.
Length, measured in thousands of miles, is the network variable
used in the study. It was not possible to acquire accurate lane-mileage
estimates for all road classes.
Two output variables, annual VMT by passenger cars and VMT
by trucks on each class of road, are used. Since the percentage 
of VMT by a vehicle type in a roadway class is not available for all
12 listed roadway classes, it needs to be estimated for those roadway
classes for which it is unavailable.
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For any given state, the percentage of annual VMT by a vehicle
type on a roadway class is available only for the top seven roadway
classes. Therefore the percentage of VMT by a vehicle type for lower
roadway classes needs to be predicted. However, a model speciﬁc to
a particular roadway class and generalized for all states cannot tell
the percentage of VMT by a vehicle type on another roadway
class. Therefore, a variable specific to position in the hierarchy is
needed. Since such a variable is not readily available, an integer
rank is given to each roadway class starting with 1 for urban Inter-
states and ending with 12 for rural local roads, at the bottom of the
hierarchy of roads. This rank is used as a variable in the model.
Zipf (4) related a variable or occurrence of an event and rank of
that variable or event; this relationship is known as Zipf’s law.
That observation is extended to relate the percentage of VMT by
a vehicle type on a roadway class and the rank of that roadway
class in the highway hierarchy.
A model that is generalized for both roadway classes and for
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FIGURE 1 Schematic representation of three-dimensional structure of highways,
highway costs, and government layers.


























FIGURE 3 Schematic representation of money flow from state and
local governments for capital outlay and maintenance costs of
highway classes.where
p ˆiz = estimated percentage of VMT by passenger cars in ith
state on zth roadway class;
t ˆiz = estimated percentage of VMT by trucks in ith state
and on zth roadway class;
Rz = rank of zth roadway class;
viz = percentage of total VMT on zth roadway class in ith
state;
liz = percentage of road length of zth roadway class in ith
state; and
α , β , γ , δ= coefficients from regression, with subscript p repre-
senting coefficients for model of passenger cars and
subscript t representing coefficients for truck model.
Since there are multiple vehicle types (passenger cars, trucks, tran-
sit buses, motorcycles, school buses, etc.), determining the percent-
age of annual VMT by passenger cars does not give the percentage of
annual VMT by trucks. The ordinary least-squares regression results
of these models are shown in Table 1.
After prediction of the percentage of annual VMT by vehicle type
for all roadway classes and for all states, these values are used in cal-
culating the annual VMT by a vehicle type in a state on a highway
class. There are two highway classes (higher and lower), an aggre-
gation of 12 roadway classes. The annual VMT by a vehicle type in
a state on a highway class is calculated as follows:
where
pZi = millions of VMT by passenger cars in ith state on highway
class Z,
tZi = millions of VMT by trucks in ith state on highway class Z,
Vz = total VMT by all vehicle types on zth class of roads,
Z = set of subscripts that represent highway class,
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H
–
= subscript that represents all roads,
H = subscript that represents higher highway class, and
h = subscript that represents lower highway class.
For convenience, the subscript i in pZi, tZi has been dropped.
The mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum
value of the variables used in this paper are shown in Table 2.
The highways in the 50 United States and the District of Colum-
bia are ﬁnanced differently, and there is no reason to expect them to
have similar expenditure shares by state and local governments. In
some states like Minnesota, New Jersey, and Colorado, the local
government assumes most of the expenditure on capital outlay and
maintenance, whereas the state government share is less than 40% of
the total expenditure. In other states like Kentucky, West Virginia, and
New Mexico, the state government ﬁnances most of the expenditure
on capital outlay and maintenance, and local government ﬁnances less
than 20% of the total expenditure. States are arranged in ascending
order of their total expenditure share in Table 3.
MODEL
Since there are three cost categories, three such models are possible
for each highway class. But the relationship between the costs and
expenditure shares and the relationship between the highway classes
simplify the model by reducing the degrees of freedom of the problem.
The relationship between the costs for any highway class is
where
x = type of highway cost;
e, E, E
–
= maintenance, capital, and total costs, respectively;
y = government layer;
g, G, G
–
= local, state, and both governments, respectively; and
Cx, y, Z = cost of type x spent by government layer y on highway
class Z.
Variables in Equation 3 are shown in Table 4, in which 27 variables
are deﬁned. However, these 27 variables are linearly dependent, so
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Passenger Cars Trucks
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
ln(Rz) - α 0.092 0.011 -0.65 0.08
ln(viz) - β 0.037 0.0089 -0.28 0.066
ln(liz) - γ -0.041 0.0069 0.28 0.05




Adj. R-Squared 0.20 0.17
NOTE:  All variables are significant at 99% confidence interval
TABLE 1 Regression Results for Percentage of VMT on zth Roadway Class by
Passenger Cars and Trucksthat if the right eight of them are known, the remaining cost variables
can be derived.
The expenditure share of the state government layer is calculated as
where qx,Z is the expenditure share of state government for cost type
x spent on highway class Z.
Since the state government expenditure share introduced in Equa-
tion 4 depends on cost variables, the number of degrees of freedom
of the problem remains 8. Therefore, if either eight independent cost
values or four independent total cost variables (any four independent
variables from Table 4) and the corresponding four expenditure
share values are known, the system of equations can be solved.
Since the objective of the study is to ﬁnd an optimal expenditure
share, costs are expressed as a function of expenditure shares as
where lZ is the length of highways in a state on highway class Z in
thousands of miles.
Since the number of degrees of freedom for the problem is 8, four
versions of Equation 5 are sufficient for the analysis; ﬁve versions
would be redundant.
Regression models were tested to ﬁt an appropriate model for cap-
ital outlay and total costs for higher highway classes and all roads. The
model with the best ﬁt is a quasi-Cobb-Douglas function as follows:
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Variables adopted in the quasi-Cobb-Douglas model (Equation 6)
are not completely serendipitous. The reason for considering (p/l) as
a variable is to reduce the multicollinearity between VMT by passen-
ger cars and length of roads in a state. Similarly, the t/(p+ t) variable
is considered to reduce the multicollinearity problems between
VMT by passenger cars and VMT by trucks. A model without these
multicollinearity corrections gives coefficients with unacceptable
signs. Outliers are tackled by taking the natural logarithm to those vari-
ables, which has a frequency distribution with considerable points in
its tail.
Expenditure share and its square are considered in the model, so
the model is capable of investigating an “optimal” expenditure share
for a typical state, at which the cost is minimum. If the optimal
expenditure share is greater than 1, the cost is minimum when it is
completely funded by state government. If the optimal value is neg-
ative, the cost is minimum when it is completely funded by local
government. If the optimal is between zero and 1, the cost should be
shared between state and local governments accordingly. A cost
function is convex with respect to expenditure share (i.e., the cost
function is minimized) if and only if the coefficients of expenditure
shares are as follows:
where x ∈ {E
–





The model described above was estimated with ordinary least-squares
regression. Results show that both total expenditure and capital out-
lay in higher and lower highway classes are convex functions with
respect to expenditure shares. Therefore expenditures attain a mini-
mum value at a particular expenditure share, which can be calculated
using the coefficients of the expenditure share variables:




Total Expenditure 1621642 1449548 176065 6331273
Capital Outlay 1092305 996747 106972 4488266 All Roads (1000's
of dollars)
Maintenance 529337 505670 51715 2224744
Total Expenditure 752433 621471 51574 2589071




dollars) Maintenance 110255 89360 6769 430575
Total Expenditure 896545 882770 104665 4268101




dollars) Maintenance 426774 442484 25061 2058820
Length of all roads
(thousands of miles) 79918 51677 5992 295306
VMT by passenger cars on all roads
(million VMT) 50765 50406 5588 274362
VMT by trucks on all roads
(million VMT) 5716 6029 607 34148




Expenditure (1000's of $)
State Expenditure
Share
New York 6331273 2689839 0.425
New Jersey 1991851 1029651 0.517
California 5938095 3089928 0.520
Wisconsin 1631278 858066 0.526
Minnesota 1843735 984290 0.534
Colorado 1312489 706665 0.538
Georgia 2320575 1254391 0.541
New Hampshire 361749 209581 0.579
Washington 1663352 967818 0.582
Nebraska 864951 512047 0.592
Texas 5334564 3272742 0.613
Michigan 1798957 1145470 0.637
Florida 4028253 2572354 0.639
Vermont 176065 113954 0.647
Arizona 1047274 679614 0.649
Ohio 2932548 1933972 0.659
South Dakota 351819 237326 0.675
Pennsylvania 2868794 1986201 0.692
Utah 527795 369830 0.701
Missouri 1748990 1234866 0.706
Alabama 1295225 922734 0.712
Massachusetts 2354514 1681030 0.714
Mississippi 860182 616542 0.717
Virginia 2242416 1637130 0.730
Maryland 1202163 884223 0.736
Louisiana 892840 658139 0.737
Maine 489024 361268 0.739
Illinois 2732796 2021191 0.740
Kansas 1131432 839875 0.742
Wyoming 322515 244777 0.759
Connecticut 805205 612964 0.761
Oklahoma 810144 623847 0.770
Oregon 924466 740186 0.801
Tennessee 1261991 1026792 0.814
Arkansas 772453 635185 0.822
South Carolina 650440 546440 0.840
Nevada 395445 338974 0.857
North Carolina 1709250 1491937 0.873
Indiana 1322573 1154715 0.873
Rhode Island 227626 200068 0.879
New Mexico 409915 368086 0.898
West Virginia 822749 776569 0.944
Kentucky 1020850 993315 0.973
NOTE: Only 43 states used in the analysis are listed here. Other states were dropped from the
analysis because of unavailability of volume data.
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EH ,, 1 -5.62 2.84 0.055 a






EH ,, 2 3.2 1.98 0.115
a




EH ,, 3 0.90 0.06 0.000
a






EH ,, 4 0.63 0.11 0.000
a




EH ,, 5 16.15 8.89 0.077
a
EH ,, 5 18.19 9.80 0.071
Constant
a
EH ,, 6 5.08 1.49 0.002
a




Adj. R-squared 0.92 0.90






















EH ,, 2 603 167 0.001




EH ,, 3 1.03 0.07 0.000






EH ,, 4 0.67 0.12 0.000




EH ,, 5 14.63 6.89 0.042
aEH ,, 5 13.08 7.87 0.089
Constant
a
EH ,, 6 577 159 0.001




Adj. R-squared 0.91 0.89
TABLE 5 Regression Results for Total Expenditure and Capital Outlay on All Roads
TABLE 6 Regression Results for Total Expenditure and Capital Outlay on Higher
Highway Class
where q* x,Z represents the optimal expenditure share of the state
government for cost type x on highway class Z.
The regression results for total costs and capital outlay for all
roads are shown in Table 5 and those for the higher highway class
in Table 6.
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The calculated maintenance cost is optimal, but the maintenance
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–
, E}a n d   Z   {H
–
, H} depend only on
regression coefficients and therefore are the same for every state.
But q* e,Z for Z   {H
–
, H} depends on C* x,G
–
,Z, which is speciﬁc to each
state; therefore q* e,Z is computed for each state separately, from
which the average value of q* e,Z is calculated.
So far, the optimal expenditure and optimal expenditure shares
are calculated only for the higher highway class and the all-roads
case. Using the results obtained from these calculations, the optimal
expenditure and optimal expenditure share for state government for
the lower highway class can be calculated.
The optimum expenditure shares obtained using Equations 8, 9,
and 10 are stochastic in nature. The values of these optimums, given
in Table 7, are calculated by using the mean values of the coefficients
of Equation 6 and are compared with the mean shares.
The results show that state government, in order to minimize
costs, should increase its share of investment in lower-class roads.
Economies of scale can be utilized to reduce the costs on lower-class
roads. States have certain advantages in funding roads like central-
ized administration and centralized purchasing of equipment and
raw materials. But state government alone cannot attend to the needs
of investment demands for roads. The trade-off between economies
of scale achieved by the state government and detailed community
knowledge available to local governments results in an optimal mix
of state government and local government funding.
Marginal Costs and Elasticities
Using the total expenditure and capital outlay functions (Equation 6),
marginal cost functions can be calculated for each type of vehicle
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where ∂ Cx,G
–
,Z/∂ pZ represents the marginal cost for cost type x on
highway class Zwith respect to VMT by passenger cars on that high-
way class and ∂ Cx,G
–
,Z/∂ tZ represents the marginal cost for cost type x
on highway class Z with respect to VMT by trucks on that class.
Cost elasticities for total expenditure and capital outlay for
annual VMT by passenger cars and trucks can be obtained by using
Equations 11. Elasticity functions (η) are as follows:
The marginal costs and elasticities of maintenance costs for the
higher highway class and for all roads can be calculated using the
values from Equations 11 as follows:
The elasticities for the lower highway class are calculated using
the following marginal costs for the lower highway class:
The elasticities of total expenditure, maintenance costs, and cap-
ital outlay for passenger cars and trucks on the higher highway class,
the lower highway class, and all roads are shown in Table 8.
It is found that highway costs are relatively inelastic with respect
to passenger cars and trucks on all highway classes. That is, a 1%
increase in VMT by passenger cars or trucks will cause less than a
percent increase in highway costs. Since economy of scale is the re-
ciprocal of elasticity, passenger cars and trucks have increasing
economies of scale.
Note that economies of scale for trucks obtained in this study are
similar to the economies of scale obtained by Levinson and Gillen (3),
whereas the economies of scale for passenger cars are different from
their results. This ﬁnding is due to different variables considered in
these studies. Levinson and Gillen adopted the price of labor and
bond interest as variables, and length of roads is not considered in
their model.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A model was developed that explains highway capital and mainte-
nance costs with respect to expenditure share by state and local gov-
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Mean 0.983 0.567 0.800 Capital
outlay
Optimal 0.977 0.741 0.877
Mean 0.988 0.390 0.524
Maintenance
Optimal 0.975 0.843 0.881
Mean 0.984 0.479 0.707
Total costs
Optimal 0.977 0.790 0.8781
TABLE 7 Optimal Expenditure Share of State Government
Compared with Mean Values of State Government Expenditure Sharethe existence of a minimal highway cost when the share of expen-
diture between state and local governments is varied. These para-
bolic models attain a minimum expenditure share. These highway
cost functions can be used in formulating policies that minimize
highway costs. It was found that a shift in highway ﬁnancial respon-
sibilities between different government layers, particularly if the
states take on a greater responsibility for lower-class roads from
local governments, can reduce highway costs.
The total amount of money spent for capital outlay and mainte-
nance on all the roads in the United States in 1996 is more than 
$69 billion. This research showed that if in every state the expen-
diture on the roads is shared between state and local governments
using the optimal share computed from the model, all states together
can save more than $13 billion, which is almost 19% of the total
cost. Of this $13 billion, 60% of the savings are obtained by re-
organizing the expenditure share between state and local governments
on capital outlay.
For research problems like this, statistical techniques like frontier
analysis can be adopted to model the inefficiencies involved; further
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research in this direction can help in better understanding the effect
of hierarchical investment on highway cost efficiencies. This study
makes no distinction based on quality of service; additional research
could shed light on the effect of the highway investment pattern
between state and local governments on the quality of roads.
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outlay 0.839 0.749 0.564 0.545 0.731 0.671
Maintenance 0.564 0.493 0.928 0.936 0.795 0.730
Total costs 0.803 0.716 0.742 0.736 0.749 0.687
Economies
of scale Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing
TABLE 8 Economies of Scale for Highway Costs with Respect to Passenger 
Cars and Trucks